

BOOK REVIEWS

Bayesian Methods: A Social and Behavioral Sciences Approach. By Jeff Gill.
(Boca Raton, Florida: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2002. Pp. 459. \$69.95.)

In Bayesian inference, uncertainty is expressed in terms of probability. More important, in Bayesian inference, probability is subjective: it is belief. Bayesian inference starts when we formulate a model that we believe is a good representation of the situation that holds our interest. We then construct a distribution over the parameters of the model—which are unknown—where that distribution represents our prior beliefs about the situation before we observe data. According to Baye's Law, the posterior distribution for these parameters given the data we have observed is proportional to the product of our prior beliefs and the joint probability of the observed variables, given the parameters. These are the components of Bayesian inference: model, prior beliefs, data, and posterior beliefs.

Perhaps no other recent development in modern statistics has attracted more attention than the renaissance in Bayesian methods. Researchers from many fields including political science have turned to Bayesian methods and Bayesian posterior simulation to expand their toolkit and engage new research questions. In support of these goals, a number of texts have been published to aid students and practitioners, and they have enabled the expansion of political science questions to Bayesian methods. Social science monographs, however, are notably scarce. One of the signal contributions of *Bayesian Methods: A Social and Behavioral Sciences Approach* is to reintroduce Bayesian inference and computing to a general social sciences audience. This is an important contribution—one that will make demand for this book high.

Rather than limit this contribution to the reintroduction of Bayesian inference, though, Jeff Gill has gone some way toward reinventing the graduate-level methodology textbook. On the one hand, *Bayesian Methods* covers all the basics necessary for students and practitioners with moderate statistics training to apply Bayesian methods to traditional regression-type problems. Discussion of the foundations of Bayesian inference, the generalized linear model, and the choice of priors provide a firm foundation for those wanting to expand their research to new methods. Even though other texts review this material in greater detail, Gill expands the material by providing computational guidance for those wishing to estimate these models in R, and exhaustive references for those wishing to reinforce their understanding of the theory presented. Once the reader is comfortable

with the basics of Bayesian inference, the following material on sensitivity analysis, robustness, and model specification flows neatly.

However, the recent attention paid to Bayesian inference is more likely a response to the intrusion of Monte Carlo methods into the field. Specifically, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods have rejuvenated this field by expanding the set of problems for which Bayesian inference is now possible and, more broadly, the set of problems for which statistical solutions are now tractable. For many problems, the algebraic burden in Bayesian analysis is so high that classical inference historically has been the default, and for many of those problems, even classical inference—usually, by maximum likelihood techniques—was problematic.

It is for this reason that the second half of *Bayesian Methods* will draw the greatest number of readers. The added value of MCMC methods is that by making Monte Carlo estimates of unknown quantities, such as parameters or missing data, from samples of points produced by a Markov chain with an appropriate equilibrium distribution, we cleverly avoid both the algebra necessary for standard Bayesian inference and the potential pitfalls in standard maximization algorithms. Gill combines three essential elements in his treatment of MCMC. First, he takes sufficient care to provide all the necessary details to understand both Monte Carlo methods and MCMC. Second, he provides full computational details for these methods. By combining these two elements *Bayesian Methods* enables readers to avoid the trap created by the wide availability of software like WinBUGS: the ability to estimate Bayesian models without full knowledge of their exacting requirements.

The third element is the combination of the practical (providing full details for assessing the convergence properties of these approaches) and the exotic (a full section on hierarchical models). Gill's treatment of the practicalities of convergence is a real service; assessing convergence and ensuring mixing and coverage is part testing, part art, and part experience. New users of the technique will appreciate this material. In contrast, the inclusion of material on hierarchical modeling at first seems unconventional; its use in political science, while increasing, has been limited. However, Bayesian inference and MCMC methods are well-suited to these types of problems, and it is exactly these types of treatments that push the discipline in new directions.

As noted, a number of monographs have appeared recently to reintroduce Bayesian inference to a new generation of computer-savvy statisticians. Those books take a markedly different approach to this material. *Bayesian Methods* is not as exhaustive or detailed as Christian P. Robert and George Casella's *Monte Carlo Statistical Methods* (2000), to which the advanced Bayesian statistician will turn. *Bayesian Data Analysis* (1995) by Andrew Gelman, John B. Carlin, Hal S. Stern, and Donald B. Rubin will remain a popular modern treatment of Bayesian methods including MCMC techniques. *Monte Carlo Methods in Bayesian Computation* (2000) by Ming-Hui Chen, Qi-Man Shao, and Joseph George Ibrahim is a more complete review of MCMC methods and algorithms. However, Gill

achieves what these do not: a quality introduction and reference guide to Bayesian inference and MCMC methods that will become a standard in political methodology.

Andrew Whitford, *University of Kansas*

The Ship of State: Statecraft and Politics from Ancient Greece to Democratic America. By Norma Thompson. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp. 246. \$35.00.)

How might political theorists respond to Tocqueville's warnings in *Democracy in America* about the increasing uniformity that arises out of democracy's incessant drive to equality and that threatens to engulf democratic thinkers in a "wish to unify and make uniform all that lies before them" (7)? This is the challenge to democratic statecraft with which Norma Thompson opens her book, and according to her, any adequate response to this challenge requires a "binary thinking" that involves balancing the two terms of any binary ("among, for example, culture/nature, reason/emotion, or masculine/feminine" [2]). Her erudite study of the history of Western political thought shows how some of the great thinkers performed this task for their own communities: the Greek polis, the modern state, and democratic America. At the same time, the book exemplifies the binary thinking she advocates by vividly bringing these works to life to act as "instructive alternatives" to our own situation (5).

Thompson's book combats the dangerous uniformity of democratic thinking in two ways, both of which arise out of her astute attention to the literary form of the texts she examines. First, she offers a reading of the Western intellectual tradition that redresses the uniformly misogynist interpretation of many feminist thinkers. According to Thompson, these thinkers succumb to the democratic urge to reduce history to an all-enveloping process by reading these works as flawed precursors to our own societal arrangements between the sexes (3). Secondly, she resists the democratic exaltation of surfaces and transparent facts by recapturing the complexity and depths of these past literary forms. Thus, she attends to the crucial distance between the authors and their literary characters as a way of opening up a space of reflection for her readers, and as a way of showing how these authors redressed the imbalances between masculine and feminine principles in their own regimes.

Ultimately the binary that Thompson is most concerned with is the one between masculine and feminine, and the other binaries tend to be mapped onto these two principles of human nature: the feminine is consistently associated with memory, the past, the family, the private, nature, and sentiment; the masculine is associated with forgetting, the present, the political, the public, culture, and reason. Her claim is that the great political thinkers recognized the need for balancing these principles in order to achieve the best political community. For these thinkers, any lop-sidedness ultimately leads to the demise of the political com-

munity (159). Thus, for example, Thompson argues that Thucydides's alleged neglect of women, the household, and the gods in *The Peloponnesian War* is a subtle literary device by which he simultaneously assumes the role of the overly masculine Athenians and criticizes this distorted perspective for leading to the demise of the polis (25). She shows Plato's dialogues, the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*, to embody a delicate balancing of the masculine principles of painting, writing, and politics exemplified by the *kallipolis* and the feminine principles of talk, speech, and philosophy embodied by Socrates (61). Thompson's book contains similarly complex readings of Machiavelli's *Mandragola*, Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Shelley's *Frankenstein*, Rousseau's *Emile*, Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, and Gertrude Stein's *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*. Though Thompson may not ultimately rescue her male thinkers from all of the charges of misogyny that have been leveled against them, her book should be required reading for anyone attempting to understand the place of women in Western political thought.

One of Thompson's most intriguing arguments is that the different literary forms used by the authors of the polis, the state, and democratic America are intricately related to the political communities that are their subject matter. Accordingly, the binaries are never "balanced" in quite the same way in different periods. Instead of the ideal of equilibrium held by the Greeks, Thompson claims that moderns like Machiavelli opt for the ideal of antithesis (74). Thus, modern rhetoric involves a more dynamic style of writing reflecting the modern understanding of nature as neither "form" nor "end" (95), and of the state as a ceaselessly shifting and unstable entity. Finally, Tocqueville's survey and Stein's "Autobiography" alternately represent a reflection and casualty of (Tocqueville) and a successful corrective to (Stein) the realities of democratic America. This reader, though, would like to have heard more about whether and how these differences in the "natures" of their political communities affected the substantive content of the masculine and feminine principles of human nature articulated by these authors.

Thompson's assertion that balancing masculine and feminine principles is a necessary component of effective statecraft seems to be specifically directed against two schools of feminist thought: "French feminist" attempts to show how the logic of binaries always works to implicitly privilege the masculine term at the expense of the feminine, and more liberal feminist arguments advocating strict equality between men and women based on an androgynous standard. But her own argument about the need to recognize the productive tension in difference between men and women and masculine and feminine qualities is actually much more prevalent in contemporary feminist theories, and situating her argument in relation to these would have contributed to her aim of producing "an account which is incisive for our time" (7). This oversight, though, does not detract from the fact that this book deserves a place on the shelf of anyone interested in democratic theory and statecraft more generally.

Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia. By Christopher Nadon. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp.198. \$38.00.)

For the past 150 years, *the* question that scholars of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* have focused upon is: If Cyrus is Xenophon's ideal leader, then why does he end the work by chronicling the immediate and utter collapse of the empire upon his death? Some, mostly philologists, have argued that the final chapter was not written by Xenophon. Others have argued that while Xenophon did write the final chapter, it does not contradict the rest of the work. To the contrary, the immediate and utter collapse of the empire serves to reinforce rather than undermine Xenophon's portrayal of Cyrus as an ideal leader. Finally, a few argue that the final chapter was written by Xenophon, but that it, and perhaps much of the eighth book, signal Xenophon's growing dissatisfaction with his ideal leader, Cyrus.

Given the prominence of this question (as well as the answers that it has produced), it is perhaps unsurprising that Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* has been neglected by political scientists. Put simply, if the only ways to read the work are as a tale of an ideal leader or the work of an incoherent mind, then the work has perhaps justly been all but forgotten by political scientists.

One of the merits of Nadon's *Xenophon's Prince* is that he manages to both cast considerable doubt upon the claim that Cyrus is Xenophon's ideal leader and persuasively argue that the *Cyropaedia* is a unified and coherent work. To accomplish these tasks, Nadon pays close and sustained attention to both the substance and method of Machiavelli's reading of the *Cyropaedia*. Substantively, Machiavelli draws the careful reader's attention to the degree in which Cyrus's political project was built upon fraud.

Methodologically, Nadon, like Machiavelli, reads the *Cyropaedia* not as a "work of history nor as political treatise, but as a drama" (14). Such a reading requires, among other things, that close attention be paid to the context of events and rules out the assumption that any one character may simply serve as the author's voice.

By re-opening the question of whether Cyrus is, in fact, Xenophon's ideal leader and reading the *Cyropaedia* as a drama, Nadon is able to advance our understanding of the *Cyropaedia* in three ways. First, by demonstrating the extent to which fraud plays a role in Cyrus's political project from the very beginning, Nadon demonstrates conclusively that Xenophon's Cyrus is not simply a leader who is too good to be true, but, at the very least, deeply flawed. This, in turn, provides a much more convincing reading of the conclusion of the work. If Cyrus is not too good to be true, then perhaps the empire's collapse is not shocking, but, at the very least, a partial consequence of Cyrus's actions. Finally, Nadon's reading calls our attention to the possibility that the *Cyropaedia* may not be a work devoted to an ideal leader, but rather Xenophon's critique of both republican government and empire. These lines of argument not only open up avenues for future research, but may even serve as an impetus for political scientists to take a second look at Xenophon, as they demonstrate that the *Cyropaedia* is

neither unrealistic nor incoherent, but a subtle and finely crafted work which illuminates the tensions that exist in all political life.

While Nadon's reading of the *Cyropaedia* is carefully argued and often persuasive, I am not wholly convinced by his Machiavellian portrayal of Cyrus. To be sure, Nadon is correct in calling attention to the manifold ways in which Cyrus employs fraud to achieve his political ends. However, what makes Xenophon's Cyrus such a compelling political figure is that he not only appears to be good, but he manages to deliver real political, economic, and social goods to his followers. For instance, even though Cyrus uses fraud to capture both Armenia and Chaldea, he does manage to deliver peace and prosperity to lands that knew neither for ages. Such a pattern is followed throughout the book, as Cyrus repeatedly manages to provide his followers with what they most ardently desire. Of course, that a political leader may be able to satisfy his followers most ardent desires may not, ultimately, be either good politics or good for human beings, as the conclusion of the *Cyropaedia* strongly suggests.

In conclusion, however, Christopher Nadon's *Xenophon's Prince* is a well-written and closely argued work that should be welcomed by not only those who study Xenophon, but also scholars of both ancient political philosophy and Machiavelli.

Robert J. Phillips, *Wheeling Jesuit University*

Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil. By Laurence Lampert. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp. 320. \$40.00.)

Nietzsche prophesied that "people may be able to read [*Beyond Good and Evil*] around the year 2000" (301). In *Nietzsche's Task: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil*, Laurence Lampert seeks to make good on Nietzsche's prophecy.

Lampert's fifth book dedicated to Nietzsche, *Nietzsche's Task*, should serve as one important model for future Nietzsche scholarship. *Nietzsche's Task* proceeds chapter by chapter, paragraph by paragraph (with the exception of the aphorisms in chapter four), offering a systematic and pathbreaking way through one of Nietzsche's most challenging texts. No other secondary source I know of has successfully given such a coherent and meaningful reading of one of Nietzsche's books. We need more books that seek a way through the labyrinth of Nietzsche's thought through close readings of his texts.

While *Nietzsche's Task* is certainly a helpful guide to *Beyond Good and Evil*, it is an interpretation, not a commentary. Citations are generally in English and quotations are few. The text serves Lampert primarily as a springboard from which to launch into a wide-ranging and at times inspired account of Nietzsche's overarching philosophical project.

The task named in the title is to rejuvenate the philosophical love of truth. As Lampert provocatively reveals in the opening line, "the task of *philosophy*: gaining a comprehensive perspective on the world and on human disposition

toward the world, a perspective that could claim to be true" (1). The provocation in such a line, of course, is the insistence that Nietzsche sought and found the true. Against the oft-repeated view that Nietzsche originates the postmodern rejection of truth, Lampert's book is a vigorous and unapologetic argument that Nietzsche is a lover and seeker of scientifically grounded truth.

The story Lampert tells is clear and, at least on one level, compelling. Pre-Nietzschean philosophy sought the true, but it recoiled from the truths it found, truths that were considered too dangerous and uncomfortable. At least in its public (exoteric) doctrines, Western philosophy embraced the noble lie of a true and constant world beyond this one as the only way to justify suffering. By the 19th century, the passionate search for truth had exposed the noble lie and with it all claims to truth. Man, therefore, whose essence is to grow and to struggle, is in danger of perishing from a lack of ideals for which he might sacrifice himself. It is at this fateful moment in the history of man that Nietzsche sets for himself the task of returning man to the hard and terrifying truths of nature that 2000 years of philosophy have striven to conceal. Nietzsche, Lampert argues, "has found the exit out of millennia of labyrinth" (23).

In order to save man, Nietzsche commits himself to philosophy, the determination of scientific truths that will yield "true judgments about the world and true judgments about history. . . ." (17). One such truth is that "there *is* a basic text of human nature. It is terrifying" (229). And yet, that truth itself has its cause in an ultimate principle of all life and all nature: will to power. All nature, man included, is simply the carrying out of an unyielding will to power that is the first cause of the world and that "provides the only possible foundation for the sciences. . . ." (88).

The will to power is true. For Lampert, the "reductionist" insistence on the scientific truth of the will to power hypothesis is an essential and misunderstood part of Nietzsche's project (45, 88). Only by "educating humanity to the truth of human nature" (230) will it be possible for "free minds" to raise themselves to philosophers who freely "bind their minds to a new teaching and that new responsibilities fall to the freely bound minds" (6). Nietzsche's task, in other words, is to recruit philosophers to the truth that will compel them to freely and nobly accept their responsibility to rule as kings according to the rational law of nature (135–36).

If the truth of the will to power is the overriding thesis of *Nietzsche's Task*, Lampert is at his best and most insightful in his penetrating interpretation of Nietzsche's erotics of truth. Not just truth, but "love of truth is the ultimate concern . . . of the whole book. . . ." (212). Thus Lampert's interpretation is rightly guided by the oft-abused opening sentence of *Beyond Good and Evil*: "Presupposed, that truth is a woman—, what then?"

Nietzsche's answer is that philosophers must learn how to love a womanly truth. While dogmatic philosophers have sought to know truth as objective truth, Nietzsche teaches that to love truth properly is to possess it as a gentleman possesses a woman. For a philosopher to love truth as a gentleman loves a woman

requires powers of seduction, for truth, as a woman, must give herself willingly in love. The philosopher submits to womanly truth and freely offers himself in “noble bondage to the higher” (269). At the same time, however, the philosopher takes truth “as his own and act[s] on her behalf. The real man, ‘a *master* by nature,’ protects and defends truth out of compassion, compassion for humanity, the species with the ambiguous stance toward truth” (285). In coming to love truth—that is, in loving the will to power and with it the world of chance, chaos, danger, and suffering—the philosopher expresses his gratitude for life and his compassion for man by freely and nobly giving himself to rule and master nature and the world (74). Out of love for truth, the philosopher must seek to raise man up to the hard rule of truth, the enhancement of the species in conformity with the will to power.

What is unique and powerful in Lampert’s interpretation of *Beyond Good and Evil* is his unified account of the book’s philosophical, religious, and political theses. At the same time, however, there is something lost in Lampert’s systematic synthesis. For despite Nietzsche’s insistence on the truth and naturalness of the will to power, he is clear that the will to power is always only an hypothesis, a posited truth. True insight into the truth of nature always comes too late, as Nietzsche writes in the preface to the *Genealogy of Morals* (III.24) and hints at in §277 of *Beyond Good and Evil*. Man is fated to miscount the bells of high noon and to remain unknown to himself. The love of truth remains, Nietzsche himself comes to see, simply the latest and noblest version of the noble lie.

Interpretive disputes aside, anyone looking to read or teach *Beyond Good and Evil* would do well to consult *Nietzsche’s Task*. To read it and not to come away with a greater love for Nietzsche is a failure of the reader, not the author.

Roger Berkowitz, *Amherst College*

Political Forgiveness. By P. E. Digeser. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. 224. \$39.95.)

Political Forgiveness is a rich, careful, and provocative argument that forgiveness has a place in public life and can sometimes even trump justice. It is unlike other conceptual and ethical inquiries into forgiveness, like Kathleen Dean Moore’s *Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest* (Oxford University Press, 1989), that relegate forgiveness to interpersonal relationships and argue that practices like pardoning can only be justified when courts have failed to provide retributive justice; instead, P. E. Digeser takes on the daunting task of constructing an understanding of forgiveness that gives the government the right to forgive wrongs, and be forgiven for them, even when retributive justice would warrant punishment.

Digeser’s analysis must overcome several critical objections. First, if forgiveness requires an emotional change, then only people, not governments, can forgive. Second, if only the personal victim of wrong has standing to forgive, then

governments cannot forgive. Third, if justice is the preeminent virtue for government, then governments ought not forgive. Fourth, if a government's wrong is not rectified by punishing the officials responsible, it is difficult to distinguish forgiveness from condonation.

In answer to the first objection, Digeser convincingly argues for a performative account of forgiveness, based on J. L. Austin's work. Insofar as forgiveness means to "release what is owed, either financially or morally" (4), Digeser argues that political forgiveness is not a description of a person's state of emotional change, but instead an "illocutionary act of self-disclosure," (4) in which the actor makes a public commitment to giving up a debt and invites restoration of a relationship. The success of this "performance" is not its accuracy in describing an emotional state, but whether it is both understood by others as a commitment and invitation (29), and carried through by the actor in the future (no further claims to punishment or debt may be made) (30).

Digeser has a more difficult time rebutting the argument that governments have no standing to forgive because he is committed to an individualism that requires him to argue that individual victims must have the first right to forgive. As a result, he must say that those who kill are unforgivable, because their victims never have the opportunity to forgive them (87). He can find standing for government to forgive only by positing that wrong harms the government's ability to promote the public welfare. The government, then, does not forgive on behalf of the human victim, but is itself a victim (116–21). This position, however, requires reinterpreting wrong as harm to the government's interests, with odd results. For example, if terrorism generates a higher level of patriotism, tax compliance, public welfare, and civic obedience for a long enough time, it may not be a "wrong" to the government's interests, even though it was a wrong to the individuals who were killed.

But a deeper conflict stems from Digeser's individualism. In a later chapter, Digeser argues that citizens have a duty to act to stop government injustice (200), even if they are not themselves harmed. Yet this argument presupposes a solidarity among citizens that would lead them to identify with each other and with their government. If citizens are in solidarity, then government may represent them in a more significant way than merely as a conglomerate pursuing their individual interests. Wrong could then be understood as an act against that solidarity, not merely a harm to interests, and government can have standing both to prosecute and forgive it. But Digeser's commitment to liberalism forecloses this possibility.

Third, Digeser must argue that forgiveness can trump justice. He argues here that justice must be served to the extent of determining the facts of the offense, but that the value of reconciliation and a recognition of the inherent limitations of procedural justice may outweigh retributive justice concerns (54–55).

Finally, Digeser concludes that governments can be forgiven for the inevitable injustices done through imperfect procedures, but injustices done for reasons of "necessity" are far more suspect (184–89). Again, Digeser seems to waver

between a strong connection between citizen and government (giving citizens the duty to stop government injustice), and a weak “angle of repose” (184–86) (citizens must be skeptical of government claims and may pursue civil remedies even when the government has forgiven. (204–05)) This vacillation generates some tension, because his central claim that government must sometimes forgive to promote reconciliation is itself a claim of necessity. If citizens are to be skeptical, how can they be reconciled? Again, the call of forgiveness pushes toward a less individualistic account of government and citizenship than Digeser provides. But his brave and careful argument for forgiveness within a traditional liberal framework will set the terms of the debate and open up new possibilities for theoretical engagement in this critical topic.

Linda Ross Meyer, *Quinnipiac University*

Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics. Edited by William R. Thompson. (New York and London: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 352. \$90.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.)

In the introduction to *Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics*, William Thompson asks whether the study of International Relations (IR) needs yet another paradigm (2). This volume, which shows that evolutionary thinking can be successfully applied to IR, purports to answer the question in the affirmative. After reading it, though, I am not persuaded that an evolutionary approach amounts to a different or new IR paradigm. Nonetheless, this impressive volume conclusively demonstrates that an evolutionary approach, in combination with politically and sociologically oriented theories, may go a long way toward improving our understanding of the mechanisms that govern and explain international change and institutionalization. More fundamentally, the volume shows, by uncovering different dimensions of political evolutionary change, that there may be a general mechanism of evolutionary change, whose manifestations include natural evolution and the evolution of political institutions, practices, strategies, and norms. This means, however, that applying evolutionary thinking to IR will be served less by the faithfulness with which we use Darwin’s or Lamarck’s theories of natural evolution than by how we identify what is unique and special about social (and therefore international) evolutionary change.

The volume consists of an introduction and four substantive sections. Thompson’s introductory chapter suggests the main concepts, variables, processes, and advantages of an evolutionary IR paradigm. Allowing for some idiosyncratic modifications, an evolutionary process exists when environmental changes induce the development of innovations, only some of which become selected and institutionalized. “Theories developed within this general paradigm are then expected to carry the explicit burden of explaining more specific processes of innovation, selection, and diffusion” (7). Thompson’s introduction also shows, however, that theorists disagree as to whether IR evolutionary approaches should (1) empha-

size cultural or naturalistic determinants, (2) be structural (top-down) or agency related (bottom-up), (3) assume that environments shape human beings (Darwin) or that human beings shape their environments (Lamarck), and (4) focus on strategies, institutions, norms, knowledge, or rivalries as that which evolves.

The volume's first section describes the evolutionary IR paradigm's main characteristics, but it also illustrates some of the disagreements mentioned above. According to George Modelski—a pioneer of evolutionary IR theory—"Evolutionary World Politics" is analogical. Hence, it can help us devise better theories of social organization and structural change—for example, about how evolutionary learning operates on social systems to produce new institutions and strategies. Vincent Falgar, on the other hand, argues that genes endow humans with specific social and behavioral characteristics, such as male dominance or in-group/out-group behavioral patterns. In an incisive essay, David Rapkin takes a middle road between Modelski and Falgar; he argues, first, that the core of social evolution is the accumulated stock of knowledge, and second, that the key to understanding selection lies in explaining when the environment makes a choice and when a learning and directed-adaptation model kicks in.

Section Two, which links evolutionary thinking to mainstream IR theory, suggests evolutionary mechanisms such as learning as alternatives to rational-choice mechanisms. In one of this collection's most suggestive essays, Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues that although the fact often goes unacknowledged, both realism and liberalism buy into evolutionary assumptions while disagreeing on the nature of adaptation. Whereas realism "concur[s] with Darwinism that human beings are primarily shaped by the environment [and are] affected by a 'selection-by-competition' logic, liberalism . . . concurs with Lamarckian perspectives that human beings are primarily shapers of their environments and the institutions they create are determined by a 'selection-by-learning' logic" (65). Hendrik Spruyt makes the liberal case when he claims that "political scientists who wish to utilize evolutionary arguments should blend learning perspectives and sociological institutionalist arguments with evolutionary theory" (110). Stewart Patrick breaks with the pack and, relying on constructivist theoretical insights, argues that changing patterns of behavior in world politics can be traced to the differential replication of normative beliefs about appropriate state conduct, which is best accounted by learning and socialization processes and by hegemonic power.

Section Three applies evolutionary interpretations to interstate rivalry and its resolution. Paul Hensel develops an evolutionary model that explains interstate rivalry "as both the product and an agent of evolution in domestic politics" (189). William Thompson suggests a theory of the de-escalation of interstate rivalry—which Karen Rasler separately and cleverly applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—according to which significant de-escalation of rivalry requires a combination of major shocks, revision of expectations, domestic policy entrepreneurship, some level of reciprocity, and continual reinforcement (225).

The final section highlights the co-evolution of institutions, technology, and economic factors. Craig Murphy offers an evolutionary theory of economic

cycles, in which social conflict triggered by industrial change can be resolved by economic and sociopolitical innovations. Sangbae Kim and Jeffrey Hart focus mainly on industrial sectors; they argue that success or failure depends “not only on a *fit* between the properties of technology in industrial sectors and types of governance structures in national institutions, but also on the abilities of nations to adjust their institutional capabilities to the given technological conditions” (286). Finally, Brian Pollins shows that the expansion of global finance can be best explained by the co-evolution of private global finance, national regulatory systems, and international monetary regimes.

A short review of a collection like this cannot do justice to each of the chapters. Taken together, however, these essays provide students of world politics with one of the best and most comprehensive volumes on evolutionary interpretations of their field. The volume has a few drawbacks, however. First, the essays range from what Modelski has called “extra-light” varieties of evolutionary perspectives (which make sparse use of the term evolution) to “strong” varieties (which develop testable and falsifiable theories of political evolution). Developing an evolutionary paradigm will require a better synthesis of and more agreement about evolutionary perspectives. Second, with only a few exceptions (e.g., Patrick and Thompson), the volume neglects the micro-foundations of evolutionary theory. We do not need a structural theory in one place and a micro theory in another. Rather, we need a macro theory (and mechanism) with clearly comprehensible microfoundations. Third, most of the essays in this volume emphasize change. Evolution, however, is not only about change, but also about replication; we need to know not only where institutions come from, but also why they manage to preserve themselves, amidst change. Fourth, the volume would have benefited from a short literature review and history of earlier attempts to use evolutionary thinking in IR. Finally, one misses a concluding chapter that would propose a synthesis of the different evolutionary interpretations and an agenda for future research.

All in all, Thompson and his colleagues have produced a much-needed collection of essays on evolutionary world politics, which is essential reading not only for IR theorists interested in evolutionary perspectives, but also for all IR theorists who are looking for better ways to explain international change and stability. More important, this volume sets a benchmark for future attempts at developing evolutionary world politics into a new IR paradigm.

Emanuel Adler, *Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the University of Toronto*

Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition. By Randall W. Stone. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. 304. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.)

Whether international institutions matter in international relations is a controversial debate in institutional studies. While realists argue that they are simply

manifestations of the most powerful member countries' interests, liberals maintain that institutions are actors that exert their own influence in world politics. Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons correctly argue that the "debate has been reduced to a dichotomy: either institutions matter or they do not. Insufficient attention has been given to the mechanisms through which we might expect institutional effects to work" ("Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization*, 1998, 723).

Randall W. Stone's *Lending Credibility* directly addresses Martin and Simmons's concern by examining the impact of international institutions on domestic policy. International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan credibility for enforcing conditions on loans to states is the focus of this book. Stone argues that the IMF can enforce such conditions under specific circumstances, thus addressing Martin and Simmons's challenge for specifying the conditions under which institutions matter. Through employment of multiple methods including a formal model, statistical analysis, and case study work, Stone examines the IMF and specifies the conditions under which it can credibly enforce conditions attached to loans given to post-Communist countries. His book addresses the question, can international institutions really hope to exercise influence in a nation's domestic affairs? If so, will that influence be beneficial? Stone considers whether conditionality is beneficial to these types of countries as they battle inflation during their political and economic transitions. He not only specifies conditions under which the IMF has effects but also whether those effects are beneficial or adverse to member states.

Building on Jon Pevehouse's analysis in "Democracy from the Outside in? International Organizations and Democratization" (*International Organization*, 2002) of how international organizations facilitate the democratization process in member states, Stone examines how a single international organization influences domestic politics and economies via loan conditionality. He maintains that this effect is mediated by political and economic policies at the national level as well as the influence of powerful states at the international level. The causal mechanisms for Pevehouse were diplomatic and economic pressure from the institution and acceptance of liberalization by domestic elites because it was connected to membership. For Stone, the causal mechanism is the structure of the IMF. He argues that although the International Monetary Fund is not a supranational organization, it does have some enforcement power to encourage states to comply with loan conditions. This power lies in its credibility to stop loan disbursements if conditions are not satisfactorily met. Given that the distribution of power in the IMF is based on contributions through quotas that determine the number of votes per contributing country, the United States is influential in whether conditions are enforced upon particular countries. If a country is important to the United States and the global economy overall, Stone argues, the U.S. is likely to put pressure on the IMF to not enforce loan conditions. Russia is such an example in this book. Stone contends that interference on the part of the United States is ultimately not beneficial to these states and prolongs the pains

of economic transition by prolonging the necessary pains inherent in battling inflation.

Stone investigates an important theoretical question in *Lending Credibility*. His rigorous analysis through multiple methods provides a more thorough treatment of a complex issue. At the same time, theoretical expectations about how institutional structure influences domestic policy are not provided, nor does Stone claim to present such expectations. The book enhances our understanding of the IMF but does not tell us much about international institutions in general or a particular class of international institutions. Given the power of the IMF in the global economy, there is great value in understanding its role in domestic politics.

Lending Credibility assesses the role of IMF structure in domestic policy. This book is also a model for a multi-method research design and how to present results from diverse methods in an accessible manner.

Kathy L. Powers, *University of Arizona*

The United States and Chile: Coming in from the Cold. By David R. Mares and Francisco Rojas Aravena. (New York: Routledge, 2001. Pp. 145. \$70.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.)

If Latin America has traditionally been heavily dependent on the United States, Chile is the exception that proves the rule. David Mares and Francisco Rojas show that Chile has had a surprising amount of freedom to strike out on its own, sometimes clashing with the northern hegemon. Did you know that after its victory in the War of the Pacific (1879–1884), the Chilean navy “intimidated the United States?” Alfred T. Mahan, the American naval officer who led a failed mission to restrain the Chilean victors, later became “the chief architect of the U.S. naval program that turned the United States into a world power” (5). Given the extent of the American transformation, one can guess at the embarrassment Mahan must have suffered at the hands of the Chileans.

Mares and Rojas’s informative book is part of the “Contemporary Inter-American Relations Series,” edited by Jorge Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro. While, as its subtitle suggests, the book focuses on the last several decades, it is also rich with historical information as it surveys the changing relationship between the two countries. We learn about their changing balance of power in the nineteenth century, as well as the domestic sources of foreign policy making in each country through different international crises. Chile initially supported neutrality in the Second World War, for example, partly out of a desire to keep out of a distant war, and partly because Germany had become Chile’s major trading partner during the Depression. U.S. and Chilean interests began to coincide more soon after the war, particularly in the fight against communism. But Chilean elites resented American efforts to use regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) against Cuban communism. Even the

conservative Alessandri government (1958–1964) resisted proposals for the OAS to intervene in countries facing a communist revolution (perhaps presciently), on the grounds of protecting domestic sovereignty (8–9).

The book is broad in scope. Besides the principal political and military affairs, it examines economic relationships and even academic and cultural linkages between the two countries. Its broad sweep is the book's greatest strength, making it an excellent resource for a survey course on Latin American politics or inter-American relations. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is also the book's central weakness. The authors discuss such a large number of factors that explain Chile's low dependence on the United States that their conclusions tend to be overly determined. The reader wonders whether all factors carry equal weight. Much as we would like to think so, are academic and scholarly exchanges really as important as the two countries' political and economic linkages?

The authors focus more closely on the Chilean side of the equation than on the American. For example, there are many countries that do not rely on the United States, but are nevertheless central to Washington's foreign policy. Previously, the list of such countries included the entire communist bloc. These days the list includes Iraq and North Korea, among others. In other words, a different explanation for Chile's surprising degree of independence from the U.S. may be that Chile does not matter all that much, compared to other Latin American countries. More important to the U.S. are countries that are not so far away as Chile (e.g., the Central American countries), or that are more economically powerful than Chile (e.g., Brazil or Argentina, at least before its recent collapse). The fact that Chile mattered most to Washington during the Allende government undermines the authors' conclusions: the reasons had more to do with U.S. Cold War policies than with Chilean capabilities, and the results of Washington's attention was a sharp curtailment in Chile's freedom to determine its own affairs without foreign interference.

The book was published in 2001, and went to press before the attacks of September 11. We can speculate that so long as Chile does not enter Washington's radar screen in the War on Terror, it may continue to enjoy the same measure of independence the authors describe it as having since the end of the Cold War. But that is a big proviso, which underscores the importance of paying more attention to the Washington side of the equation than the authors do. Perhaps the central question is not Chile's relative independence, but rather how Chile has managed to get Washington's attention—be it negative or positive—at different points in time. Because the book is structured as a broad historical survey of the relationship between the U.S. and Chile, these alternative questions or explanations are not really analyzed.

A sharper focus would have permitted a more powerful analysis. But this shortcoming detracts only slightly from what is otherwise a valuable contribution that is sure to become a key reference point in the study of inter-American relations.

Pablo Policzer, *University of British Columbia*

Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies. By William Bernhard. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002. Pp. 237. \$60.00.)

The literature on central banking has expanded dramatically in recent years. A simple Internet search for the term “central banking” generates a list of thousands of books and articles. Central banks have been cut, sliced, and examined by journalists, policymakers, economists, political scientists, and even watchdog groups in a variety of ways. In the presence of such information overload, William Bernhard’s book, based on his dissertation research, stands out as a significant contribution to the study of the political economy of central banking. This is a book that will be widely read and cited in studies of central banking and comparative and international political economy.

Why did some industrial countries have independent central banks while others had dependent central banks in the 1970s and 1980s? What explains such cross-national variations? In a country such as Germany with arguably the highest level of central bank independence, why have politicians remained committed to an independent Bundesbank? What accounts for the wave of central bank reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s? What explains the differences in the timing of central bank reforms in countries such as Italy and Britain? Why were European politicians so committed to the single currency and one European central bank? Bernhard addresses these related and distinct questions in his book.

In a three-player (government, central bank bureaucrat, and legislator), asymmetric information, sequential game, the problem is that the government may have an incentive to manage monetary policy in ways that are not in the best interest of party legislators or coalition partners. Moreover, the government, together with the central bank, is better informed than the legislator about how monetary policy relates to economic outcomes. The problem leads to intra-party conflict that reduces the chance of the party to win elections and stay in office. The comparative static result compares two scenarios, one in which the central bank is dependent on the government and the other in which the central bank is independent of the government. Intra-party conflict is reduced if the government and the legislator share the same policy preference ordering, regardless of central bank independence, or if the central bank is independent of the government and the central bank and the legislator share the same policy objectives. The sequential equilibrium results suggest a wide range of testable implications. The choice of an independent central bank is most likely when the government possesses policy incentives that differ from party legislators and coalition partners and when those back-bench legislators or coalition partners can punish the government. The threat of a legislative veto over the government appears to ensure that the government remains committed to an independent central bank and an independent central bank serves to quench the suspicions of the legislator about the government. As an independent central bank reduces intra-party conflict, it simultaneously increases the chance of the party to win elections and remain in power and,

hence, the cabinet duration appears to be longer. In contrast, when system-wide external conditions such as rising economic openness cause policy preferences to become more divergent within parties across countries, a widespread movement toward more independent central banks can be expected. Bernhard tests these empirical expectations in a series of historical and statistical analyses.

The book is appealing and important in a number of ways. The intra-party conflict theory links political parties to central bank independence, accounting for a wide range of empirical regularities. It is theoretically novel, logically consistent, and empirically powerful. Bernhard also conducts a pioneer analysis that accounts for the choice of central bank independence, an area that remains extremely underexplored. Without understanding the political causes of central bank independence, institutional reforms that seek to strengthen the central bank are unlikely to occur or sustain. Shedding light on the political causal mechanism, the book has important policy significance. The conclusion that the central bank, even if independent, can be held accountable spells good news for democracy, removing concerns over the democratic deficit of delegating authority to secretive technocratic central bankers. Last but not least, Bernhard offers an exemplary scholarly work that integrates formal modeling, rich historical cases, and statistical analysis, which makes it suitable for graduate courses in comparative and international political economy.

While Bernhard argues his theory also explains the timing of central bank reforms, the time element is missing from the formal model and empirical evidence is not marshaled in a convincing manner. The Italian reform appeared to be motivated by intra-party conflict as much as it was by inter-party competition between the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats. The British case was consistent with the theory, but it may suffer from case selection bias. A more systematic empirical analysis seems to be in order. Alternative theories about partisan differences and political business cycles may shed as much light on the timing issue as Bernhard's intra-party conflict theory. Table 9 lists 10 reform episodes for only a small sample of countries (120). More definitive evidence can be expected if the intra-party conflict explanation as well as the partisanship and the political business cycle theories are tested simultaneously on all reform events.

Theoretically, it remains vague how the intra-party conflict explanation for cross-national differences in central bank independence relates to alternative causal theories that focus on inter-party competition and interest groups. Empirical results in Table 3 offer no definitive evidence against the partisanship theory, given the crude measurement of partisanship (90). Financial sector strength is statistically significant, and its effect is argued away statistically, not theoretically. In a sense, the intra-party conflict explanation may be as potent an alternative as the others. Perhaps it is possible to theorize in a way that integrates the intra-party conflict theory with the alternatives into an integrated causal model.

The statistical effect of central bank independence on cabinet durability appears weak in Table 8 (116). A very probable reason is that the empirical model

is not specified in a manner consistent with the theory. According to the argument in Chapter 6, rising economic openness across industrial democracies causes greater intra-party conflict over monetary policy, which decreases cabinet durability, which in turn leads many governments to reform to raise central bank independence, which ends up increasing cabinet durability. Following this causal mechanism, both central bank independence and cabinet durability are endogenous. They should be modeled simultaneously rather than in a single equation model framework.

Quan Li, *The Pennsylvania State University, University Park*

The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development. By Amie Kreppel. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 263. \$60.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.)

Amie Kreppel has produced an innovative and empirically rich study of how the “critical moments” in the evolution of the European Parliament (EP) have influenced the internal structures of the institution as a whole, the supranational party system, and the party groups. Her study is timely as well, given the dramatic change in the balance of power within the European Union (EU) over the last 15 years, which have seen the EP move from the sidelines of the legislative process to become an actor with more co-equal authority alongside the Council and Commission. This work sheds much needed light on the implications of this accretion of power for the inner workings of the EP and the legislative process of the EU as a whole.

The theoretical framework adapts models of the American congressional system (e.g., Nelson Polsby and David Mayhew) to the EP with the ultimate aim of developing generalizable, comparative research on legislative systems. Kreppel’s main innovation is to explicitly link a macro (external) and micro (internal) model together to account for the complex, dynamic nature of institutional evolution. After modification to the EP/EU context, the macro-micro framework is used to map out a terse set of distinct, testable hypotheses. The macro model essentially predicts that the timing of institutional change will follow chronologically from exogenous change. The micro model tracks the substance of reform and predicts an emphasis on collective goods while the EP lacks legislative input. But after acquiring power, the model predicts a rise in internal divisions and rules increasingly skewed to benefit the “majority” (in this case the largest party groups) who manipulate internal structures to their advantage.

How have external increases in legislative authority translated into internal reforms? Her findings point to a parliament that is more rule-based, internally centralized, and ideologically moderate. Because the EP’s legislative power is “nonhegemonic” and has high threshold requirements (absolute majority), there are incentives for cooperation and ideological moderation. Thus, as the EP acquired power, party group polarization decreased (increased moderation of

views) and intergroup cooperation increased (to work effectively with the Council and Commission). Kreppel also finds that the EP has become less egalitarian, and reform has rewarded the European People's Party (EPP)-Party of European Socialists (PES) "oligarchy" (who regularly control between 50% and 70% of the seats) at the expense of smaller parties and groups. Then again, a few things have not changed. Most important, Kreppel finds ample evidence that national delegations still control internal leadership positions and committee assignments (202–209). Another near constant is the EP's embarrassing rate of absenteeism (historically near 50%).

Perhaps the most impressive feature of the book is the high bar that is set for methodological rigor and a research design based on multiple streams of data. Kreppel makes deft use of multiple methods and carefully sorts through the inherent incommensurability between periods (before/after direct elections, before/after the addition of cooperation and codecision procedures). Her research design includes more than 60 interviews with members of the EP and party group officials between 1996–1998; content and statistical analysis of proposed and adopted revisions to the EP's Rules of Procedure since 1970; statistical analysis of voting behavior (300 roll-call votes from 1980 through 1996; random sampling that includes 100 resolutions, 100 cooperation procedure votes, and 100 codecision procedure votes); and content analysis of the internal rules for the EPP and PES since 1975.

While the evidence offers convincing support for her macro-micro model, Kreppel does not shrink from pointing out where the model falls short and where there are gaps in the data. She points out, for example, that neither the macro nor the micro model can fully explain the "stunted nature" of internal party group reform (212), though she interprets the creation of the Conference of Presidents as an explicit attempt by the party group elite to wrest power from the national delegation leadership and create a more centralized mechanism to distribute benefits and sanctions.

One ambiguity of the volume is how the macro-micro model fits into the broad theoretical tradition of the "new" institutionalism. The affinity with the American congressional literature places it comfortably within the camp of Rational Choice institutionalism, yet Kreppel says little about how alternative institutionalisms might offer competing or complementary explanations. Implicitly, she seems to borrow from one "alterative" institutionalism and ignore another. In the case of the former, it is unclear how the macro model's focus on "critical moments" differs from Historical institutionalism (HI). The explanation for the signal importance that ideological organization had on the party group system or, for example, the delayed impact of the Single European Act (SEA) on the EP's internal structures strongly (if implicitly) endorses HI's focus on path dependence and unintended consequences. In addition, she omits any consideration of Sociological institutionalism (SI) and more culturalist approaches that would highlight the role of informal norms and social constructs in accounting for the character of internal reform. SI might help gain a better handle on the informal

rules that evolved to help entrench the power of the national delegations within the party groups. March and Olsen's well-known "logic of appropriateness" might help account for why the smaller political groups supported (119–22) the Maas-tricht-era revisions that reduced their relative power. Did individual members perceive certain obligations (in addition to calculating benefits and consequences) as their legislative power and visibility in the public eye increased? Rather than contradict or refute her main findings, a more systematic comparison between institutionalist insights would likely add depth and complexity to the story of the EP's evolution, something future research should address. In the meantime, the parsimony, clarity, and richness of findings offered by Kreppel's model has much to offer. This book will no doubt become standard reading by EU scholars as well as theoretically minded comparativists interested in the evolution of legislative systems.

Jeffrey Lewis, *Oklahoma State University*

Middle East Politics Today: Government and Civil Society. By Tareq Y. Ismael. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. Pp. 510. \$59.95.)

The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. Edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Pp. 380. \$59.95 cloth, \$22.50 paper.)

Tareq Ismael presents us with an ambitious project. The difficulty that readers may face is discovering the primary thrust of the book in the massive quantity of information provided. An important theme raised early, though, is the link between the birth of Arab nationalism and the rise of Islam. This has important implications for secular and Christian Arabs in their struggle for Arab nationhood, something that goes without mention. The author does note that during the Islamic era, civil society was granted a great deal of freedom (68). Through the case studies the fact that such freedom has all but vanished in the region cannot slip by without notice. The extent to which this pattern first developed during the post-Ottoman period is not debatable, but the extent to which oppression has been perfected by Arab leaders is beyond debate too.

Absent from the discussion of the Iranian Islamic Revolution is serious discussion of those who operate in the bazaars. They played a crucial role in the fall of the shah, and their role is critical if a viable civil society is to take hold in Iran. Nor does the author discuss in much detail the crackdown on groups that assisted Khomeini's rise to power and whose members were then jailed or executed, evidencing the totalitarian nature of the new leader and regime. Instead, passing mention is made of the concern that many opposition groups had about a secretive and exclusive body created by Khomeini, referring to it as a "reflection of the lack of a common viewpoint among the disparate groups opposing the status

quo" (123) rather than as an indication of the true nature of Khomeini. It was at this point in Iranian history that a true civil society had an opportunity to develop, but was prevented from doing so by Khomeini and his followers. Today, fledgling political movements (including students and women) and the press play a crucial role in laying the groundwork for civil society in Iran.

Lebanon certainly has numerous factions and patterns that merit in-depth exploration, even if the groups themselves fail to rise to the status of contributors to civil society. The author's explanation of the Lebanese civil war is brief, though it makes the conflict quite understandable. Lebanon had evolved into the ideal type of "uncivil" society, and the real issue during the conflict was not the oppressive regime confronted by other Arab people, but a powerless government. Militias are hardly a substitute for social movements, political parties, and professional organizations.

While the author's brief look at Israeli political parties helps the reader to understand the political divides in Israeli society, there is no mention of the Israeli peace movement, an important part of Israeli civil society, or non-Jews and the Arab political parties in Israel. Instead, great attention is paid to the rise of the far right.

Although Palestine has not yet gained recognition as an independent state, the first *intifadah* was certainly evidence of the role that groups can play in an attempt to link the people to a dreamed-of government. Neighborhood and block committees, religious groups, political movements—all contributed to the preparation for a viable civil society in the Middle East. A chapter on Palestine would have been welcome.

Gulf Cooperation Council members are grouped into one chapter, but the chapter has the advantage of a strong section on civil society, with discussion on religious associations, professional organizations, and other social and opposition groups. A question arises: What will happen to the development of civil society, or alternatively, what role will civil society play, when the oil revenue disappears?

The strongest chapter in the book regarding the political space filled by groups is the final chapter—on Egypt. The author sets the tone in his discussion of groups in the 1940s and 1950s. Despite the history of organizations in the twentieth century and the continuing proliferation of organizations, the author rightly points out that because of the role of elites and governments, "civil society [is] a term with no meaning in Egypt" (443).

That is an appropriate concluding statement about most of the region. The reader is left to discern the conclusion, though. The book presents a strong general overview of the Middle East and would be a useful introductory text.

In the second book, Raymond Hinnebusch sets out a theoretical construct for individual authors, and readers, to follow, building on "a modified form of realist theory. . ."(1) The substate and suprastate identities that many Middle Eastern leaders confront can be constraining or manipulated, but always troublesome. While elected officials in the West may feel constrained by the public, they only

have failure to be reelected to fear. Many Middle Eastern leaders may have to contend with revolts if they stray too far from the will of the street.

The new, or aspiring, leaders of the region (sons who have succeeded or may succeed their fathers) raise numerous questions. Is the pattern evidence of the "increasing durability and stability of Middle Eastern states" that Hinnebusch refers to? (11). Will the effect be further moderation of foreign policies because of implied legitimacy and credibility? Or will the new generation of leaders eventually have to radicalize their foreign policies to maintain (or create) legitimacy? Young leaders in precarious positions may ultimately act in unpredictable and destabilizing ways, threatening at least the traditional realist model.

Hinnebusch's chapter on Egypt rightly focuses a good deal of attention on Nasser and clearly explains how the late president managed to distinguish himself from his fellow Free Officers. It would not have been surprising to see those surviving revolutionaries challenge the arrogant Sadat more aggressively. It was Sadat's own brand of unilateralism that did him in; it was not at the hands of the military elite, but a similarly disgruntled segment of the military. If Nasser "reacted" (101), then Sadat acted, seemingly forcing the events around him rather than responding to them. Actions eventually sealed his fate.

Just a few years ago, a chapter on Yemen would have been all but ignored, but Fred Halliday's contribution to the book is very timely. While building on the theoretical construct mentioned above, Halliday assists students/readers from the outset by placing Yemen into a clearly comparative context. Its similarity to other Arab states is most apparent through its elite-dominated policy making. What separates it from many of its neighbors is its strategic location. Like many Arab states it sought unification, but not necessarily under any pan-Arab ideology; rather, it was in response to imperial-inspired division. Speculating how the foreign policies of two separate Yemens would differ from each other if the division were present today is an interesting exercise. Halliday's discussion of Yemen's dilemma following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gives us some insight. Yemen found itself with a rather divided leadership, to say nothing of the citizenry. While divisions may be somewhat different today, the identity crisis is no less apparent when looking at Yemen's "cooperation" with the U.S. war on terror. The U.S. must publicly praise the Yemeni government today, while having condemned it just a few years ago, in hopes that it will crack down on its erstwhile Islamist proxies.

No state has undergone more of a change in approach to foreign policy than Iran. Anoushiravan Ehteshami notes the importance of identity and role for the Islamic Republic. This is clearly a case of where you stand depending on where you sit ideologically. Revisionism is alive and well under Khatami, but it may be his successor who will truly create an Iranian policy that breaks from an ideological framework.

Ultimately, the foreign policies of ten states are addressed. Each case study applies the same formula by looking at foreign policy determinants, foreign

policy making, and foreign policy behavior. Such a formula gives this book an edge over many edited, and even single author, works. Other contributors include Clive Jones on Israel and F. Gregory Gause III on Saudi Arabia. This is a good introduction to the topic and endnotes will direct those who have an interest to additional reading. Charts and graphs that looked at military expenditures over time, demographics, trade, and foreign assistance would have helped create the context for a given country and the region. A chapter on the Arab League and an appendix of supporting documents would also have been beneficial, though the latter are certainly accessible.

The opening chapter may be a daunting read for those without a strong background in international relations; the case studies are much more approachable. The book, therefore, would be useful in either a Middle Eastern politics or a comparative foreign policy course.

Timothy J. Schorn, *University of South Dakota*

Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica. By Fabrice E. Lehoucq and Iván Molina. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 277. \$60.00.)

This book provides a detailed case study of electoral processes in the small Central American country of Costa Rica during the first half of the twentieth century, a period when electoral fraud remained a persistent problem, and yet regular and successful efforts were made to reform the system. The authors state that they have three goals, in increasing order of specificity. The first is to systematically study the phenomenon of electoral fraud itself, which has yet to be given much empirical attention in the Latin American historical context. The second is to explain how specific types of electoral reform (e.g., change from a two-stage process relying on electors to direct elections) influence fraud in how it is accomplished and how much takes place. Third, they wish to gain a better understanding of why some incumbent politicians seem willing to back electoral reforms that reduce their ability to use fraud to their own personal advantage.

In attempting to answer the third of these questions, Lehoucq and Molina rely on an institutional account that stresses the fact that presidents appear to have reformed fraud-producing electoral systems when they found such legal change useful for promoting their political agenda in other ways, such as through the reduction of electoral uncertainty. At its heart, their analysis of executive and legislative behavior is under-girded by the rational choice assumptions of game theory that Latin Americanists have come to associate with scholars such as Barbara Geddes. They view this so-called institutionalist approach as having more explanatory power in the Costa Rican case than either sociological theories (such as those of Seymour Martin Lipset) that stress the reformist impact of material changes in domestic class structure, or office-seeking theories (those of

Anthony Downs) that seem problematic when it comes to explaining any type of redistributive political reform movement.

The authors' database for assessing the validity of their institutional arguments is derived from 123 petitions that various political parties submitted to the Costa Rican Congress from 1901 to 1946 to protest some 1,366 alleged instances of electoral fraud. Lehoucq and Molina provide an impressive array of tables analyzing various aspects of these data. They devote considerable attention to analyzing the shifting geographic distribution of fraud and its impact as it moved over time from the rural periphery to the urban center of the country. In attempting to explain this movement, they reject the sociological determinism of those who view it as having been an inevitable result of such factors as increasing urbanization.

Lehoucq and Molina's single-minded quest for an institutional answer to the puzzle of electoral reform severely limits the range of alternative explanations that they are willing to seriously consider. Most contemporary empirical studies of Costa Rican politics conclude that these reforms were the result of much broader noninstitutional changes taking place at the regional and local levels. For example, the United States' construction of the Panama Canal led to much greater diplomatic interest in Central America and to a push for regional unification that brought with it increasing concern for democratic governance. During the period under discussion, we not only see the international diffusion of ideas concerning democratic governance but also the simultaneous creation of new urban middle classes—classes that may have been more receptive to these ideas.

One of the most striking things about Costa Rican politics from a regional comparative perspective is that the process of electoral reform, which resulted in a reduction of fraud in early twentieth-century Costa Rican politics, began at a time when the country had much higher levels of voter participation and much lower levels of fraud than existed elsewhere in Central America. As many scholars have pointed out, this strongly suggests that there were probably nineteenth-century pre-conditions that made the process of institutionally fine-tuning reforms in the next century possible.

While one can thus have strong reservations about the explanatory power of their institutionalist argument, Lehoucq and Molina's book will still be of considerable value to the global community of scholars interested in explaining electoral fraud and solving the puzzle of why politicians sometimes decide to promote reforms that seem to run counter to their personal self-interest. It has value precisely because they challenge the various arguments put forward by students of regional democratic processes such as John Booth, James Mahoney, John Peeler, Mitchell Seligson, Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Robert Williams, and Deborah Yashar. This is a work of considerable sophistication and underlying methodological rigor that should appeal to a broad cross-section of scholars in the field of comparative electoral politics.

Steve C. Ropp, *University of Wyoming*

Legislative Politics in Latin America. Edited by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xxi, 503. \$65.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.)

Conventional wisdom has long held that the executive is all-powerful in Latin America. Legislatures have generally had no more than a rubber-stamp function, the story goes, and when they have sought to assert themselves in the policy process, presidents have simply invoked their extraordinary constitutional powers to impose their policy preferences. The authors of this volume challenge these views through close empirical analyses of legislative behavior in four cases: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. While none denies that the executive enjoys a dominant, and potentially excessive, role in the policy-making process in these countries, they demonstrate collectively that legislatures are far from irrelevant. The particular role that legislatures play in the policy process, however, depends on a host of institutional, contextual, and conjunctural factors.

The book is anchored in rational choice institutionalism, and the authors speak primarily, if not exclusively, to debates over how formal institutions structure the behavior of individual politicians. Specifically, the authors seek to test assumptions behind work on the U.S. Congress, as well as earlier theories on how particular institutions (e.g., electoral laws and formal constitutional powers) affect legislative performance in Latin America. The results, particularly when compared across cases, demonstrate important limits to general theorizing on institutions. Institutions do matter, the authors argue, but they matter in different ways in different times and places. Not only do particular institutional rules (electoral laws, for example) interact with a variety of other institutional arrangements that are not constant across cases (e.g., specific powers of the executive and legislature, federalism), but the impact they have will also be affected by case-specific, noninstitutional factors like party reputation, ideology, informal norms, shifting partisan configurations, and various types of crises.

The book begins with a strong introductory chapter by Scott Morgenstern. He emphasizes that even the most basic assumption behind much work on the U.S. Congress, namely that legislators always have the primary goal of reelection, cannot hold in Latin America where reelection rates are often very low. Moreover, Latin American legislators function in institutional settings and within party alignments that are vastly different from the United States, meaning that even though the general assumption of individual ambition holds for Latin American and U.S. politicians alike, the specific goals and strategies of Latin American legislators will not match those of their U.S. counterparts. The case studies in the book help to identify, then, what those specific goals and strategies are and explain their origins.

The case studies are organized into three sections of four chapters each (one on each of the focus countries). The first section offers articles on executive-legislative relations, the second on political parties and legislative structure, and the third on the role of legislatures in specific policy processes. While it is useful

to group the articles in this thematic way, I found it more useful to read all the articles on each country together. This provided a more complete picture of how and why the legislatures functioned as they did in each case, in turn facilitating comparison across countries.

I cannot do justice to these twelve rich and (generally) highly readable case studies in this short space. Instead of treating them individually, then, I attempt here simply to summarize the general insights they offer. Above all, the cases demonstrate that the key to (relative) legislative strength is the institutionalization of the legislature, which results when congressional representatives have the time and motivation to develop policy expertise (417). Thanks to the high potential for reelection in Chile, for example, politicians can hope to make careers in the legislature, and their extended stays in office render congressional committees sites of important policy expertise and experience (Carey, Londregan, and Siavelis chapters). In Mexico, where reelection is prohibited, and in Argentina and Brazil, where rates of reelection are relatively low, congressional representatives have little incentive to cultivate policy expertise. Instead, they seek to secure future political posts for themselves outside of the national congress, either by bringing back pork to subnational powerholders, as in Brazil and Argentina, or by serving as faithful agents of the president and head of the party, as in Mexico (Casar, Eaton, Jones, Mustapic, Nacif, Samuels, and Weldon chapters).

This might imply that stronger legislatures could be built simply by allowing or encouraging reelection to congress in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. However, the authors highlight a variety of factors that contribute to the behavior of legislators, only one of which is their expected time in office. One crucial variable appears to be whether political parties are parochial/clientelistic or nationally oriented/programmatic. Once again, Chile stands out with its broad spectrum of highly institutionalized, policy-oriented political parties (442). Political parties in Argentina and Brazil, by contrast, are simply electoral and patronage machines, with the notable exception of the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil. Mexico's parties, including the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the National Action Party (PAN), appear to operate more like their Argentine counterparts than like Chilean parties. While parties have and will adjust to different incentives offered by the electoral system, it is clear that the ways in which they organize themselves and do business are determined by a number of variables, most of which are not amenable to institutional engineering.

The authors of this book are committed to the objective of building general theory, and they take a clear and important step toward that goal. The best of the essays (that is, most of them) draw on detailed case knowledge, not all of it easily quantifiable, to test established assumptions and hypotheses in both the American and comparative politics literature. Most of these do not hold up well. However, the findings of complexity and heterogeneity both across and within cases do not deter the authors from their quest to better theory building (see especially, concluding chapters by Morgenstern and Morgenstern and Cox), and

neither should they deter readers. Indeed, the book should be required reading for all serious scholars of comparative politics.

Elisabeth Hilbink, *Princeton University*

The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics. By Zoltan Barany. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. 408. \$24.95.)

It is an extremely rare occasion when a social scientist embraces the literature and research approaches of many different disciplines in a clear, concise, and well-crafted fashion. In this book, Zoltan Barany weaves a rich tapestry of political science, geography, political history, political economy, anthropology, sociology, and comparative Eastern European studies with ethnic and racial studies to examine, evaluate, and tease out policy implications for the historically marginalized Roma or Gypsy Peoples of Eastern Europe. Utilizing a comparativist framework, he documents the seemingly intransient placement of Roma at the very bottom of social, political, economic, cultural, and racial hierarchies regardless of regime structure and despite the post-communist institutions.

The essential question he addresses is the extent to which the multiple regime changes in the post-communist era have had an impact on Roma social, economic, and political status. Lacking reliable data sources traditionally utilized to examine the multiple determinants of marginality, he aggregates in-depth interviews and utilizes judicious decision-making skills while cross-referencing sources to eliminate possible inaccuracies. The payoff is the most rigorously researched work to date on Roma marginalities.

His analyses begin with an assessment of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires and evolve to focus on seven contemporary nation states: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. He gives particular attention to governmental institutions and their relationships and policies toward minorities. The underlying framing dynamic of his study is "that regime type provides useful guidelines to predict minority policies because it demarcates the range of minority policies" (23).

The early chapters provide a comprehensive overview of various regime types while cataloguing the conditional variables constituting state policies toward minority group members. The multiple endogenous and exogenous sources of political marginality are summarized in order to develop a profile of gypsy marginality appropriate for the time-span of the analyses. Like comparable studies addressing marginalized populations in the United States, Barany examines ethnic political mobilizations, linking them to the almost universal condition of relative deprivation and political exclusion responsible for political mobilization and collective action. The core historical and socioeconomic documentation of Roma marginality emanates from the imperial age, and the geographical areas studied remain relatively intact today.

One major contribution in the initial chapters is the detailed history of the gypsy holocaust, also known as Porajmos. Most scholars are not aware that Roma were considered by the Nazis as one of the lowest caste of prisoners. The estimates of gypsy holocaust victims ranges from 200,000 to 1,500,000 and represents another major tragedy Roma encountered—but it also illustrates their marginality and the extremely poor data available on Roma populations.

Answering the question, “Are Roma better off today than they were during the reign of socialist states?” requires a thorough documentation of Roma socioeconomic and political stature in the pre-reform era. Utilizing interview data and content analyses of official policies, Barany masterfully illustrates the magnitude of changes in social and economic conditions of Eastern European Roma from the mid-1940s until the late 1980s. The descriptive assessments make the argument that Roma enjoyed significant improvements. While they remained in the bottom socioeconomic ranks, Roma had benefited from full employment, free education and health care, and the other state-supported policies. But what are the trade-offs associated with the acquired benefits? Were Roma traditions, cultural expressions, indigenous languages tolerated by the “main-streaming” state doctrines? Were the requisite resources available for gypsy leaders and political spokespersons to mobilize Roma interests? This is only one of a few instances where Barany should have offered additional analyses. I wish he had addressed the above attributes while linking them to the contemporary racial construction theories like those of Omni and Winant (*Racial Construction in the United States*, 1994).

The remaining task addressed is the evaluation of the extent to which democratic reforms save the day, promote socioeconomic improvement, and enhance the dismal state of interethnic relations in Eastern Europe. Global urbanization and the accompanying population migrations have reconfigured the geographic location of marginalized populations including the Roma. A thoughtful discussion of the implications of these macro-level modifications and the impact of emerging democracies appears in the final chapters. Barany details the lack of socioeconomic advancement associated with the introduction of democratic regimes while also noting that even with the emergence of international non-governmental organizations, the development of Roma-based political parties, and limited Roma political mobilization, public opinion polls indicate the continuance of extremely negative attitudes toward Roma in Eastern Europe. Overt statements of hatred and discrimination against Roma remain commonplace, and there are no indicators of concerted efforts to eradicate the dismal status of Roma existence.

Barany argues that the reformed regimes in the early 1990s did not ignore the complex social, political, and economic status of Roma; however, he notes, “they could have undoubtedly done much more” (325). His suggestions for a long-term program of Romani integration for Eastern European governments have some utility, although limited generalizability, for scholars studying other marginalized and mobile populations. The proposals might be a bit too idealistic especially in

light of my observation that Barany needs to associate these indicators to the larger, more global political economic trends. Still, kudos are due to Zoltan Barany for his groundbreaking research, pioneering scholarship, and unwavering commitment to rigorous analyses of the Eastern European Roma.

John G. Bretting, *College of Charleston*

The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in the Former Yugoslavia. By Franke Wilmer. (New York: Routledge, 2002. Pp. 339, xvii. \$90.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.)

This book seeks to explain ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and argues for a “constructivist” interpretation, which emphasizes the cognitive and psychological factors that led to war. The empirical sections are based on lengthy fieldwork in several of the former Yugoslav Republics, where Franke Wilmer conducted interviews with citizens from a range of ethnic groups and social classes. The empirical sections are accompanied by an extended and richly textured theoretical analysis. Throughout the book, the Yugoslav case is compared with other instances of political violence, such as the anti-Tutsi killings in Rwanda, the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia, and Idi Amin’s Uganda, as well as Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.

Wilmer succinctly summarizes her basic questions as follows: “why war . . . why *here*, and why *now*” (173). In answering these questions, Wilmer emphasizes the importance of ethnically charged propaganda, advanced by demagogic leaders, who sought to advance their own political agendas. It was this elite propagandizing, Wilmer argues, that caused ordinary citizens to set aside traditions of ethnic pluralism and opt for war.

Several other factors are discussed in addition to propaganda. Wilmer considers the history of ethnic competition in Yugoslavia, including the bloodshed that accompanied the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia during World War II when Croatia formed a Nazi puppet state that persecuted Serbs, as well as the Partisan revenge against Nazi collaborators after the war. Wilmer notes that the “historical narratives,” which resulted from these events, set the stage for later violence during the 1990s. She also discusses popular ethnic stereotypes that emerged in her interviews (e.g., the perception of Serbs as lazy, the Croats as pro-German, the Albanians as thieves). Such stereotyping also played an important role in establishing the “cognitive distance” that made it easier for normally law abiding citizens to engage in atrocities. Above all, there is an emphasis on the importance of feelings and thoughts as causal variables: “Before we begin to kill each other, we *think* each other to death” (266).

Wilmer repeatedly returns to the theme of nationalist propaganda as the decisive variable, which counteracted traditions of ethnic tolerance and triggered violence. Consistent with the constructivist paradigm that informs her analysis, Wilmer affirms that people’s understanding of their ethnic identities are socially

constructed. In Yugoslavia, it was propaganda that played a key role in the particular type of social construction that led to rape, pillage, and murder.

This is an intelligent study on a vital subject. The theoretical sweep of the book is impressive, with a wide survey of literature in constructivist theory as well as excursions into realism, feminism, postmodernism, and psychoanalysis. The empirical sections, which contain lengthy excerpts from Wilmer's interviews, add important primary source material on how ordinary people felt about the war and the atrocities associated with it. For the most part, Wilmer presents a reasonably balanced account of the Yugoslav conflict and avoids the excessive Serb bashing that mars many studies in this area.

There are two basic flaws with the book. First, psychological variables are overemphasized and narrowly constructed. Wilmer's argument that large numbers of ordinary people were duped by propaganda seems unconvincing; it also begs the question of *why* they were so easily duped. Wilmer neglects the economic and material variables that influence the cognitive processes she describes: in the case of Yugoslavia, the economy underwent a massive economic deterioration, beginning with a debt crisis during the late 1970s. The years preceding the breakup of the country and the initiation of war were ones of extreme economic deprivation, comparable in scale to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Given these conditions, it is no wonder that the population was so susceptible to nationalist propaganda. Other important cases of nationalist extremism, such as Nazi Germany and Rwanda in 1994, were also preceded by severe economic downturns. Yet, Wilmer provides no significant discussion of these economic factors.

Second, Wilmer's suggestions for preventing ethnic violence seem vague and casually thought out. At one point she writes: "Perhaps . . . what we need are decentered identities, where no identity is privileged within a truly pluralistic normative environment" (143). This suggestion ignores the fact that the Yugoslav Federation—Wilmer's object of study—was one of the most decentered and decentralized political systems in the world prior to its breakup; it was indeed a multiethnic environment, where no single ethnic identity was privileged.

David N. Gibbs, *University of Arizona*

Policy and Politics in State Budgeting. By Kurt M. Thurmaier and Katherine G. Willoughby. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000. Pp. 374. \$77.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.)

The National Association of State Budget Officers' *Fiscal Survey of the States* (2002) reported that state governments spent over \$500 billion from their general funds during fiscal year 2001. Given the large sums involved in carrying out state government operations, it is perplexing that few studies have explored budgetary decision making at the state level. What studies exist tend to focus on macro-level issues. Kurt M. Thurmaier and Katherine G. Willoughby argue that the theoretical models used to explain outcomes at the macro-level (primarily

Incrementalism and the Garbage Can Model) are largely inadequate to explain how budgetary decisions are made at the micro-level. Their book is an important first step in filling this gap in knowledge.

Thurmaier and Willoughby examine the decision processes of budget examiners working in executive budget offices. To do this they interviewed 182 budget officers in 11 states. This approach separates their research from most state budgeting studies because it analyzes detailed information from multiple states. As a result, they are able to make valid generalizations while providing a high level of specificity that brings a sense of realism to the analysis and fills important holes, particularly regarding deviations to general rules.

The crux of the book is a model relating budget office orientations to roles played and rationalities employed by budget examiners and how this relationship affects the recommendations that examiners make. The book classifies state budgeting offices as having two major orientations. Control-oriented offices fit the traditional characterization of "guardians of the purse," interested primarily in keeping a lid on excessive spending and maintaining accountability over agencies. Examiners in control-oriented offices tend to be far removed from policy issues. Policy-oriented offices, in contrast, are concerned with the policy implications of the budget recommendations they make to their governors. Thurmaier and Willoughby find that the more levels of hierarchy separating examiners from the governor, the less policy-oriented an office tends to be. Thus, examiners in direct contact with their governors tend to be highly policy-oriented, largely because they have a greater sense of their chief executives' policy preferences and levels of commitment to particular programs. Of course, the degree to which any budget office fits within either a control or policy orientation varies by state.

Thurmaier and Willoughby show that office orientation affects examiners in two important ways. First, in policy-oriented agencies the roles examiners play with their respective agencies is less adversarial and more focused on helping agencies meet the policy goals of the governor. Second, the rationalities used by examiners to make budget recommendations is affected by office orientation. Examiners in control-oriented offices rely heavily upon economic and technical rationalities that are centered on selecting the means that maximize given ends. Social, political, and legal rationalities, which are more concerned with end values, are utilized to a larger degree by policy-oriented examiners. Thurmaier and Willoughby argue that these factors play a large role in shaping the types of budget recommendations made by examiners.

Overall, the book makes a valuable contribution. It should be of great interest to both scholars and practitioners involved in the study and practice of public budgeting, public administration, or policy analysis. The literature review alone, especially as it pertains to scholarship on state budgeting, makes it worth a space on the bookshelf. Students in MPA programs will benefit from the book's in-depth look at the micro-issues they are likely to confront when they enter government work. This is true not just for budget examiners, but for any administrator

involved in pushing for policy change, expansion, or maintenance. To this end, two chapters that examine in great detail the decision processes of two “typical” examiners, one in a policy-oriented and one in a control-oriented office, provide particularly valuable insights. More broadly, the book offers a theoretical framework for decision making that is likely to be more useful for practitioners than the macro-level theories that are traditionally taught.

The biggest shortcoming of the book is that it says little about the impact examiner recommendations have upon final appropriations. There is some mention of the relative influence policy- versus control-oriented agencies have upon gubernatorial recommendations to the legislature, but no discussion of how the different orientations affect final outcomes. Does having a policy-oriented budget office help the governor pass his or her policy preferences? If not, then why does the orientation of the budget office matter? Despite not answering these questions, Thurmaier and Willoughby provide an important foundation for others to build upon in order to increase our understanding of state budgeting.

James W. Douglas, *University of South Carolina*

Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy. Edited by W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. 489. \$74.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.)

Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy brings together 20 different essays by prominent scholars analyzing such topics as “Citizens, Consumers and the Public Sphere” and “Mediated Political Information and Public Opinion.” This volume is important for scholars interested in theory building in the areas of mass political participation (and elections), media politics, and public opinion. Selected readings would also work well in classes emphasizing those themes, especially Robert M. Entman and Susan Herbst’s “Reframing Public Opinion as We Have Known It;” William Gamson’s “Promoting Political Engagement;” and Doris Graber’s “Adapting Political News to the Needs of Twenty-First Century Americans.” “Issue Advocacy in a Changing Discourse Environment,” by Kathleen Hall Jamieson, deserves a read as well as M. Lance Bennett and Jarol B. Manheim’s “The Big Spin: Strategic Communication and the Transformation of Pluralist Democracy.” Both of these chapters provide an important discussion of interest group involvement in campaigns.

While the editors are correct that they have not built a “single story,” I argue that two of the most important themes in this book are, first, the media and the development of mass identities and therefore the public sphere; and second, whether the media treat individuals as consumers or citizens. Both themes relate to the type of political information provided and the norm building and identity creation that the media could do. While these two themes are prominent in prior literature, this volume shows how the future of democracy is affected by new media. These themes are prominent throughout the five sections into which

Bennett and Entman have organized this book. Diverse methodologies—quantitative, qualitative, and theoretical—underlie these works.

“The Impact of New Media,” by W. Russell Neuman, provides a theoretical basis for understanding the role of the media in the creation or destruction of a sense of community and identity. Using “mass society theory,” he describes four ideas that “deal broadly with the character of the public sphere, the distribution of political information, belief, preferences, and behavior” (304). These concepts are social cohesion, fragmentation, stratification, and polarization. The central concepts, fragmentation (a counterpoint to social cohesion) and stratification (“vertical differences between elites and masses in political information” (304)), harken to Robert Putnam’s work in the area of social capital. Neuman’s empirical analysis notes that the Internet may reduce the transaction costs of getting information and may actually promote participation and attentiveness, rather than fragmentation. It is this work, however, combined with the work on segmentation and targeting (which may promote isolation and separation) that gives cause for concern.

The new media and new research methodologies make it easier to target certain audiences. In “Dividing Practices: Segmentation and Targeting in the Emerging Public Sphere,” Oscar H. Gandy says the theory behind the public sphere requires that discussion and debate be inclusive. “Segmentation and targeting [are] in direct conflict with these requirements in that the effect, if not the primary purpose, of segmentation and targeting is the exclusion of participants who are deemed unlikely to support the preferred view” (142).

Similarly, “National Identities and the Future of Democracy,” by Wendy M. Rahn and Thomas J. Rudolph, adds a global dimension to the fragmentation argument. Rahn and Rudolph note that a sense of national identity must exist for compliance with basic norms and rules for living in a democracy. They find that access to the Internet correlates with a weakened sense of nationalism (but interestingly, more support for more global nation-states such as the European Union). More study is needed, they note, to understand how supranational organizations might inspire more loyalty. However, “The Internet and the Global Public Sphere,” by Colin Sparks, gives us very little encouragement about the possibility of a global public sphere that might lead to the creation of supranational institutions anyway.

The second theme deals with the type of information the media provide. Do the media consider members of the public citizens or consumers? Timothy Cook clarifies this question in his chapter, “The Future of Institutional Media.” He notes that the media are so important because not only do officials use the news to communicate to the public and each other, but the public also relies on the media as a source of political information. He writes that “the dilemma emerges in the tenuous links to citizenship, given the ascendancy of communication that relies upon private financing, that see its audience less as participants to be mobilized than consumers to be reached by advertisers and that consequently focuses on certain news values that have little or less to do with the quality of public policy”

(184). "Greater profit-mindedness of the news media" (194) leads to cost-cutting measures that soften the news. He predicts that even in an era of multiplicity of news sources that political figures will continue to use the media to communicate with each other. The theme is further explored in chapters about the difference between entertainment and news (if any) such as that by Michael X. Delli Carpini and Bruce A. Williams ("Let Us Infotain You: Politics in the New Media Environment").

Not really mentioned in the volume is how the public journalism movement might be used to encourage the public sphere and build future political participation. While this movement has been criticized by members of the media, there is still reason to believe that the media, and especially new media, can play an important role in informing citizens in a much more proactive manner. (For example, some PBS/NPR stations such as KQED in San Francisco are working to create civic dialogue via the Internet and via "old" media: radio and television). Such work in building the public sphere, especially among the young, bodes well for the development of a sense of community or identity that may encourage political participation so needed for the future of democracy. Also little mentioned is the role of public broadcasting. Given the fact that the younger audiences do watch local news (Graber), public broadcasting stations (increasingly the only locally owned media remaining) should play a significant role in building community among younger individuals.

Martha Kropf, *University of Missouri-Kansas City*

The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality. By Tali Mendelberg. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. Pp. xv, 307. \$17.95.)

Tali Mendelberg explores one fundamental question: "What makes white voters respond when leaders denigrate or subordinate African Americans?" Using an eclectic methodological approach and varied data, she answers this question by developing and testing her theory of racial appeals. Mendelberg uses historical studies of racial politics, communication analysis, national survey data, experiments, and content analysis of the news coverage of the 1988 presidential campaign to develop and test her argument about the effectiveness of racial appeals in mobilizing white voters.

From a historical perspective, Mendelberg delineates a theory of racial appeals and explores the use of explicit racial appeals within the American party system as racial norms changed from the nineteenth century to the contemporary period. She examines in detail implicit racial appeals and how they are conveyed by the news media. The Willie Horton story provides the basis for her conclusions regarding the media's implicit racial appeals. Mendelberg "analyzes the real-time vote choices of a national sample exposed first to an implicit and then to an explicit phase of a presidential campaign" (26). She presents her findings of tests conducted in the homes of voters to determine the effects of implicit and explicit

racial messages as well as “counter stereotypical messages” showing white welfare recipients. She finds that implicit messages are more effective than explicit messages or nonracial messages.

Mendelberg argues that racial appeals are the result of a party system shaped by racial conflict. Implicit racial messages emerge when a society renounces racism and, through political struggles, accepts the norm of racial equality. The norm of racial equality does not mean, however, an end to racial conflict or a repudiation of racial stereotypes. The civil rights movement helped change racial norms and by so doing “catalyzed a legal and political transformation that incorporated racial conflict into politics” (117). This facilitated within American political institutions racial resentment and a “psychological battle” among white people between racial equality and racial resentment.

The Republican party is on the “racial right” and appeals to white racial resentment and stereotypical views of African Americans for electoral success. These messages are articulated implicitly to avoid “violating the norm of racial equality,” while mobilizing white voters who wish to “adhere to the norm of racial equality,” but “resent blacks’ claims for public resources and hold negative racial stereotypes regarding work, violence, and sexuality” (17). Prominent Republican governors primed white voters’ racial resentment by discussing welfare and crime in “a way that conveys derogatory references to African Americans” without explicitly raising the issue of race (6). The power of this approach is that it can activate racial predispositions without the “awareness of those who hold them” (20). The Republican party’s political strategy has little room for African Americans. Its overtures to African-American voters are largely symbolic; designed to avoid the racist label and to win the support of moderate whites. Implicit appeals lose their effectiveness once they are challenged and made explicit. Relying on studies of racial politics, Mendelberg asserts that Democratic candidates do not challenge Republican racial appeals for fear of being viewed as candidates for African Americans. Democrats are able to get away with this because they are not challenged by African American political elites.

Mendelberg offers two strategies to defeat implicit racial appeals. One, she argues for the “mainstream egalitarian party” to challenge “the use of implicit communication on the grounds that it violates an egalitarian norm” (274). Two, she calls for “a more difficult task” of modifying “the norm . . . to confront individual predispositions that lead to stereotype, fear, or resent the subordinate group” (274). Mendelberg speculates however, that an egalitarian norm “may not moderate whites to policies that aid African Americans;” it simply may “moderate the racial determinants of that opposition, leaving room for nonracial determinants such as ideological conservatism” (204). A more “effective defense against racial appeals requires an issue that trumps race in the consideration of white voters.” In the twentieth century, according to Mendelberg, this issue was “cherished social welfare programs” (103). Unfortunately, she does not elaborate on an issue that “trumps race” for the contemporary period.

The Race Card will become required reading for students of racial politics. It is certainly worthy of such status. Nevertheless, there are flaws with the book.

One, insufficient attention is given to how African Americans perceive and respond to implicit racial messages. Two, no effort is made to explain why and under what conditions African-American political elites protest racial messages. Do they view all racial appeals the same? Are their responses influenced by their political and institutional affiliations? Three, Mendelberg fails to deal with the complexity of the American party system, especially the conflicts within the Democratic party and the implications of the Democratic Leadership Council for racial equality. Democrats have articulated racial messages: Bill Clinton with welfare reform, tough on crime and soft on affirmative action is but one outstanding example. Four, Mendelberg fails to address the material interests that many whites have in maintaining the present racial arrangement, which predisposes them to implicit racial messages.

Willie M. Legette, *South Carolina State University*

Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment. By John H. Kessel. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001. Pp. ix, 292. \$34.95.)

John Kessel's *Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment* argues that the institutional presidency serves as the vital link between presidents and a complex policy-making environment. The core thesis, referred to as the dual adaptation argument, "is that these [White House staffing] units must adapt to both the work style of the incumbent and the habits of the clientele groups (journalists, diplomats, legislators, and so forth). By serving the needs of both the president and the external institutions, they stabilize the White House within the political environment and ensure their own survival from one administration to the next" (ix).

This book is divided into three sections. The first three chapters provide a descriptive sketch of the institutional presidency from the Eisenhower through the Clinton administrations. Kessel analyzes four common roles that organizational units in the executive branch fulfill when dealing with Congress and the media: coordination, information gathering, decision making, and exerting influence (4). Kessel also discusses "task-specific" activities that each organization conducts on a regular basis such as holding press conferences, serving as policy advocates, and gathering information on legislative proposals.

Chapters 4 through 6 comprise the second section of this book. Kessel chronicles the common and specific activities that key executive departments and staffing units carry out in foreign, economic, and domestic policy. Although each policy arena provides challenges for the White House, domestic policy is more complex than foreign or economic policy. Presidents require the assistance of numerous policy experts to handle domestic affairs. In addition, the historical record demonstrates that the secretaries of state, defense, and treasury and the attorney general have had greater access to the president than those cabinet departments that focus mainly on domestic matters. Kessel also notes that

because domestic policy is much more multifaceted than foreign and economic policy, a greater number of problems arise in domestic affairs (166–67).

The executive branch spends a considerable amount of time combating “brush fires” that occur when a policy crisis creates obstacles for the White House. According to Kessel, “staff members devoted more time to this than to any other function” (184). Unfortunately, Kessel discusses this topic in less than two pages and provides anecdotal evidence about the importance of White House “fire fighting” from only one Nixon and Reagan staff member.

The theoretical section of this book occurs in Chapters 7 and 8. Although this final section highlights an important topic on the presidency, the discussion strays from the central thesis. Specifically, Kessel shifts his focus from exploring the institutional presidency to evaluating the policy achievements of individual presidents. Kessel analyzes presidential success, failure, and mixed outcomes in public policy based on his evaluation of 161 cases. He concludes that contemporary presidents have achieved more success than failure in the realm of policy. Although presidential success is dependent on numerous variables, Kessel argues that the president’s personal interest in policy issues, his level of expertise, and his political skills are the central components that determine policy success (235). In contrast, a lack of presidential expertise and political power, changes in the political environment that shift the government’s attention from one policy to another, and the degree of personal attention that chief executives place on specific policies can cause presidents to fail in achieving their policy goals (235–36).

The findings question the conventional wisdom that failed presidencies arise when chief executives are not reelected for a second term. Kessel argues that scholars must move beyond assessing the policy records of presidents within the time frame that they hold office. Instead, presidential success and failure are sometimes dependent on the policy directions of future presidents.

This book does not provide much information about how Kessel classified each of his cases of public policy as a presidential success, failure, or mixed outcome. Furthermore, he provides no empirical evidence to show the success and failure rates for each president since Eisenhower. As a result, we are presented with a limited amount of information about the degree of variation that occurs between each administration. The book also fails to explore whether specific variables such as the president’s party affiliation are related to the level of policy success.

This study concludes by formulating a rudimentary theory regarding the president’s behavior in policy making based on a two-by-two matrix. The two dimensions used to classify presidential policy actions are expertise (presence or absence) and attitudes (strong or weak). This matrix predicts that presidents who possess expertise and have strong attitudes are most likely to establish policies that reflect their own agendas. Presidents who lack expertise and have weak attitudes may engage in a variety of actions such as developing policy through trial and error or carving out a policy course without a clear direction. In contrast, presidents with strong attitudes but no expertise often become embroiled in partisan battles over policy while chief executives with expertise and weak attitudes

fail to create innovative policies. However, presidents rarely display this last type of policy behavior (242–43).

Kessel recognizes that his theory is very simplistic and that a better approach for classifying presidents would account for varying degrees of presidential expertise and attitudes. A further problem with the matrix is that the concept of attitudes is not clearly defined. More serious is that Kessel does not clearly demonstrate how his theory directly relates to his core thesis regarding the institutional presidency. Instead, the role of executive departments and the White House staff fades away from his discussion.

In sum, Kessel provides a wealth of descriptive information that will benefit scholars who seek to expand or refresh their knowledge about the institutional presidency. Undergraduates will find Kessel's book to be very readable and engaging because of his attention to historical details and the incorporation of material from personal interviews. Furthermore, this study should foster in students a greater appreciation for the administrative challenges that the George W. Bush administration is confronting when dealing with homeland security and terrorism.

Adam L. Warber, *Clemson University*

Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals. By David E. Klein. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x, 180. \$55.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.)

The title of this book accurately reflects that it is a study whose analysis is confined to the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals, particularly those cases in which the courts are engaged overtly in the making of new legal policy. But one would be badly mistaken to assume that the analysis and conclusions boldly spelled out by Professor David E. Klein are relevant to or of interest only to those with a particular concern with the intermediate appellate courts. Instead, this book has important things to say about the nature of the judicial process and how we understand the role of law in our legal system. It is one of the more important books on law and courts that has been written in recent years and should qualify as a must-read for all scholars in the law and courts community.

Due to limits on their control of their docket, the courts of appeals decide many cases that involve the straightforward application of settled law. Nevertheless, the courts also have the opportunity to decide a substantial number of cases in which there is neither an existing legal rule nor a Supreme Court precedent that clearly governs the principal issue before the judges. It is these opportunities for rule making that are the subject of Klein's analysis. Specifically, he examines all the decisions between 1984 and 1991 that announce new legal rules in three areas of law: antitrust, search and seizure, and environmental law.

The primary goal of the analysis is to "better understand the influences at play in circuit judges' decisions on unsettled issues of law" (133). The central concern

is to understand two types of interactions: those among circuit judges and the hierarchical relations between circuit judges and the Supreme Court. Examining those two types of interactions, Professor Klein pays particular attention to the relative significance of law, judicial preferences, and strategic calculations. A series of specific hypotheses is generated from a review of previous studies of appellate courts and from in-depth interviews with 24 judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.

The interviews suggest that a substantial majority of the judges are willing to acknowledge that achieving legal rules that are consistent with their political preferences is a legitimate goal in a nontrivial number of cases. However, virtually all of the judges also claimed that achieving legally sound decisions was an important goal for them. Moreover, while much of the political science literature on judicial decision making (e.g., Spaeth and Segal 1999) treats these policy and legal goals as incompatible with each other, the judges do not.

To examine the hypotheses that both these policy and legal goals matter, Klein examines the decisions that judges make when they are confronted with the choice of whether to adopt the rule announced by other circuit judges to the issue before them when the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue. The results of his multivariate probit analysis of 300 decisions indicates that consistent with the expectations derived from the Attitudinal Model, the ideological proximity of the median judge on a given panel to the ideology of the panel that first announced the rule is significantly related to the probability that the new rule will be adopted. However, the results suggest that a number of other variables that appear to be more consistent with a goal of achieving sound legal decisions are also significantly related to appeals court judges' decisions. Judges give strong deference to a rule adopted by another panel of their own circuit as "required" by circuit legal norms regardless of the ideology of the original panel or the ideological direction of the rule. When a rule was first adopted by another panel, the greater the number of other circuits to have adopted the rule, the greater the likelihood that the next panel would adopt the rule. In addition, the prestige and expertise of the judge writing the first opinion that announced the rule have a significant effect on the likelihood that subsequent panels will adopt the rule. However, the extent to which the rule is consistent with the preferences of the current majority of the Supreme Court is unrelated to appeals court decisions. These legal influences appear to be relevant in all three of the issue areas examined.

Interpreting the quantitative results while reflecting on the views of the judges expressed in interviews, Klein makes a convincing argument that circuit judges "seemed to act with little regard for what the Supreme Court might think" (134). Precedent announced by the Supreme Court appears to weigh heavily in the calculus of the judges; but in the absence of clear precedent, there was little evidence in either the quantitative analysis or the interview data that the current or future views of the Supreme Court or the likelihood of reversal had any substantial effect on the decisions of appeals court judges in policy-making situations. This lack of concern with reversal may reflect the reality that the courts of

appeals are rarely reviewed. Even in these cases that involved explicit rule making by the courts of appeals, only 4% of the decisions were reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Overall, this is an important book for both its methodological and substantive contributions. The quantitative analysis in this book appears to be well designed and executed with great care. Care is taken and good choices are made both with decisions about how to measure phenomena and how to conduct the statistical analysis. A superb job is done of blending the results from this quantitative analysis with insights gained from the elite interviews. Given the clarity of the explanation of the methods, the care with which hypotheses are derived from theory, the creative manner in which measures are constructed for the test of those hypotheses, and the skill with which the results from these multiple approaches are interpreted, this relatively short book could be used very effectively in a graduate course on research methods. David Klein neatly demonstrates how good research is carried out.

Substantively, this book makes an important contribution to the way we think about the relevance of law for judicial decision making. Klein makes a persuasive argument that making legally sound decisions is an important goal for many (perhaps most) judges at all levels. His analysis convincingly supports his conclusion that judges often share both a concern for legal soundness and common standards for evaluating it. This has a significant impact on their decision making even after one controls for the effects of political preferences.

In one sense, this book does not directly affect the debate in the discipline over the adequacy of the Attitudinal Model as a complete and sufficient explanation of decision making on the Supreme Court because a different court is examined. But Klein's argument that the differences between the institutional contexts of decision making on the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have been overstated is convincing. Thus, the importance of legal soundness as a goal of judicial decision making is quite plausibly as true for the Supreme Court as for the "lower" courts. In any event, the analysis in this book suggests that in future studies of the Supreme Court it would be fruitful to abandon the exclusive preoccupation with investigating whether legal rules act as *restraints* on judicial decision making and instead investigate whether on the Supreme Court, as on the courts of appeals, legal soundness is an important *goal* that leads to the active search for legally appealing solutions.

Donald R. Songer, *University of South Carolina*

The View from the States: National Politics in Local Newspaper Editorials. By Jan Vermeer. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. Pp. 176. \$75.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.)

In the early 1990s, I interviewed a prominent member of the Illinois State Senate, and I asked him how important editorials in local papers are. He said

bluntly, “Editorials are huge.” When I asked him why, he recounted his first Senate election in which he saw literally hundreds of voters walking into voting booths carrying newspaper editorial endorsements with them.

Despite the tremendous advances political scientists have made in studying the importance of the news media in recent years, editorials still receive little attention from researchers. Jan Vermeer’s ambitious and interesting book begins to address this significant research gap. Further, by focusing on newspapers from medium-sized cities, such as Providence, Rhode Island, and Fresno, California, he broadens the scope of research beyond the overused national media sources.

Vermeer argues persuasively that editorials on national issues from newspapers in medium-sized American cities can provide us with useful insights into how people receive important political information. While he acknowledges that editorials may not regularly persuade voters (7), he makes a powerful case that these editorials help readers tie national events to local interests, often represent shared local values, and are certainly read by local politicians. He also finds substantial divergence between editorial topics and popular news stories during his sample period, which strengthens his case.

The “legwork” involved in his study was extensive. Vermeer read every editorial from the 10 newspapers he selected in 1994—7,823 of them. He then selected those dealing with national issues, 2,321, and spends the bulk of the book discussing their content and potential impact on readers. His sample is based largely on geography. In future research, the author probably should consider the ideological slant or corporate chain of each paper.

Since there is little prior research upon which to draw, it is understandable that the author would take a cautious approach. His analysis is essentially qualitative; he is reading and interpreting editorials and looking at broad trends—not hypothesis testing (15). While this is reasonable, the reader is sometimes left wanting a bit more systematic analysis of the data, particularly in the later chapters. His findings give readers much to stimulate their own research.

The book is organized thematically around different governmental institutions. Some of the broad themes in the editorials are just what we would expect. Editors typically support pork barrel spending if it is in their district or serves a local interest and consider it wasteful if it is in someone else’s. Bureaucrats are typically characterized as thoughtless robots in a system dominated by foolish rules, and the federal government should not burden states with unfunded mandates.

But other findings raise interesting questions. Editorial writers seem to share the same biases as their readers—they love their member of Congress and bash the institution. The chapter dealing with the president is striking for the relative naiveté of editorials that address how the Congress should address domestic initiatives from the president. The editorials Vermeer cites all suggest that Congress should play a very limited role in helping to shape legislation with the president. The editorials about Clinton’s performance in the late summer of 1994 also seem to predict the Democratic party’s disaster in the midterm elections. Do editorials shape public opinion or mirror it? This is an important finding that merits further

research and shows that editorials might be good variables at gauging public sentiment.

Vermeer finds that most of the editorials dealing with the Supreme Court are different in tone and content from those on the Congress or president. Analyses of court decisions by editors were surprisingly devoid of ideology. Ideology was also absent in editorials on then-nominee Stephen Breyer. Instead, the editors seemed more intent on explaining the local impact of Supreme Court decisions to their readers. The author argues that this is consistent with public opinion on the Court, which is relatively nonideological and different when compared to the other institutions. It may be, but could it not also be the case that by focusing on one year, we have captured a single data point in the time series? The Court in 1994 was remarkably centrist. Surely the results would be different from the late 1950s? Again, Vermeer's results raise interesting questions for future research.

The book would be improved with tables in each chapter showing more detailed distributions of the tone and topic of editorials. This is particularly true for the bureaucracies chapter in which the author seems to be inconsistent with his characterizations. However, these are small quibbles when compared to the unique nature of this book. This is overall a nice piece of broad introductory research into a relatively understudied and important part of our political system.

G. Patrick Lynch, *Liberty Fund*